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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua James Finch appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his postconviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November 2013, in the course of executing a search warrant at Finch’s residence,
officers recovered various hazardous materials from which one could build explosive devices.
(R., pp.23-47.) Finch ultimately pled guilty to aggravated assault, unlawful possession of bombs
or destructive devices, unlawful possession of firearms, and two counts of felony injury to a
child. See State v. Finch, 2015 WL 2329260 * 1 (Idaho App. 2015) (unpublished). The district
court imposed an aggregate unified 25-year sentence with 13 years fixed. See id. On appeal,
Finch asserted that his sentences were excessive, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentencing determinations of the district court. Id.
Finch filed a pro se post-conviction petition in May 2016. (R., pp.5-18.) The district
court granted Finch’s motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in the proceeding. (R.,
pp.66-68.)

The district court ultimately construed Finch’s post-conviction petition, which

appointed counsel chose not to amend, as raising the following claims: (1)(a) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress certain statements Finch made to police after
he invoked his right to remain silent; (1)(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prevent the
statements Finch made to police from being considered by the district court at sentencing; (2)(a)
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to submit, for the court’s consideration at sentencing, an
evaluation authored by Dr. Derrick May; (2)(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to submit,
for the court’s consideration at sentencing, testimony from Finch’s girlfriend; (3)(a) the state
violated Finch’s constitutional rights by destroying some of the samples of materials recovered
from under Finch’s residence and/or by withholding that they had done so in violation of Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3)(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Finch’s
destruction of evidence/Brady claim in the course of the underlying criminal case; (4)(a) trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a copy of the mental health evaluation from Dr. May;
(4)(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge government investigate” [sic]; (4)(c)
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prevent the police from destroying the evidence
recovered from beneath his residence; (4)(d) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an
“adversarial process” and for refusing to go to trial and/or failing to adequately prepare for trial;
(4)(e) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court’s consideration, at
sentencing, of a psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Arnold; and (5) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the district court’s denial of Finch’s motion to suppress. (R.,
pp.133-152.) The state filed a motion for the summary dismissal of all of Finch’s claims. (R.,
pp.78-90.)
After a hearing (1/17/17 Tr.), the district court entered a memorandum decision and order
(R., pp.130-156). The court first noted the lack of clarity in Finch’s post-conviction claims and
its difficulty in construing them. (R., pp.130-131, 134-135.) The court then construed the claims
as noted above. (R., pp.133-152.) The court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal
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with respect to claims 2(a), 2(b), 3(b), 4(a), 4(b), and 5. (Id.) The court denied the state’s motion
for summary dismissal with respect to claims 1(a), 1(b), and 3(a), but set forth alternative
grounds for the dismissal of those claims and gave Finch 20 days to respond. (Id.) In its motion
for summary dismissal, the state did not construe Finch’s petition as containing claims 4(c), 4(d),
4(e), and did not specifically move for the dismissal of these claims, so the court provided Finch
20 days to respond to its notice of intent to dismiss these claims as well. (R., pp.151-152.) The
court next noted that the state had additionally responded to claims which the court did not
construe Finch’s post-conviction petition as actually containing. (R., pp.153-154.) The court
chose not to address these theoretical claims, but provided that Finch could, within 20 days,
clarify or amend his post-conviction petition if he disagreed with the manner in which the court
construed his post-conviction petition. (Id.) With respect to all of the claims it addressed, the
district court concluded that Finch failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he was
entitled to relief, and/or that the claims were conclusory. (R., pp.133-153.) Finch did not
attempt to amend his post-conviction petition or otherwise cure any of the petition’s defects in
the subsequent 20-day period. (See 5/11/17 Tr., p.5, L.13 – p.7, L.3.) Instead, Finch and his
appointed counsel informed the district court that Finch did not want counsel to amend his
petition. (5/11/17 Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.17.) The district court verbally dismissed the petition
and indicated that it would subsequently prepare a written judgment. (5/11/17 Tr., p.7, L.20 –
p.8, L.20.
Finch filed a notice of appeal prior to the entry of a written judgment. (R., pp.176-179.)
The Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed the appeal due to the lack of an appealable
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judgment (7/13/17 Order), but reinstated the appeal after a judgment was entered (8/2/17 Order).
The district court appointed counsel to represent Finch in the post-conviction appeal. (R.,
p.180.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case.
(3/27/18 Order.) Finch proceeds pro se.
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ISSUES
Finch states the issues on appeal as:
1.)

Did trial counsel (criminal) violate Appellant’s constitutional right(s) to a
MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION?

2.)

Did the District Court violate Appellant’s constitutional rights after the
court ordered a Mental Health Evaluation and said evaluation was never
conducted?

3.)

Did post-conviction counsel violate not only clearly established law(s)
contained in the state’s RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and her
client’s lawful and constitutional right(s) during the course of the hearing
where she informed that “her client” [waived] his right(s) to amend his
application…when in fact, her client never stipulated any such conduct?

4.)

Did the state violated Appellant’s constitutional rights to present a
complete defense when it [destroyed] all pertinent material evidence
regardless of the fact that Court GRANTED the opportunity for the
defendant to subject the state’s evidence to Forensic Testing(s)?

5.)

Did Post-Conviction counsel commit “Subordinate Perjury” when she
stood before the Court and provided false and misleading testimony?

6.)

Was Appellant subjected to “cumulative error” in the totality of both the
Court’s and Counsel’s conduct?

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7 (verbatim).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Finch failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Finch Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Finch contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-conviction

petition. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) Finch has failed to demonstrate that the district court
erred. A review of the record and Finch’s appellate brief reveals that Finch has failed to assign
any specific error to the district court, has failed to adequately support his assertions with
argument or authority, and has attempted to raise unpreserved issues on appeal. In any event, the
district court correctly dismissed Finch’s petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Finch Failed To Make A Prima Facie
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief With Respect To Any Of His Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
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relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d
738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction

application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on its own
initiative, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond.
I.C. § 19-4906(b). However, where the district court grants a party’s motion for summary
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), the motion itself serves as the notice, and no additional
notice from the court of the dismissal is necessary. Workman, 144 Idaho at 523-524, 164 P.3d at
803-804 (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)); see also
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). In such a scenario, a
petitioner is instead entitled to 20 days’ notice from the state’s motion for summary dismissal

7

before his petition can be dismissed by the court. See Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900
P.2d at 798 (citing State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 488, 632 P.2d 676, 677 (1981)).
It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error has the burden
of showing it in the record.” Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428
(2014) (citation omitted). It is equally well-settled that the appellate court will not review
actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search
the record for unspecified errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23
(1983). Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are
lacking.” State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Finally, Idaho’s appellate courts “will
not consider issues not raised in the court below.” State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252
P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504
(1992)).
On appeal, Finch primarily takes issue with the assistance provided by his appointed
post-conviction counsel in the underlying proceeding in this case. (See generally Appellant’s
brief.) Specifically, Finch asserts that his counsel failed to adequately communicate with him,
violated the Idaho Professional Rules of Conduct in numerous respects, and failed to respond to
the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss. (See generally id.) This claim is not properly
before this Court. There is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Nor is ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief. See I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.; Lee
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v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 832 P.2d 1131 (1992); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 743 P.2d 990 (Ct.
App. 1987). Even if it were, such a claim would be waived in this case because it was never
raised to or adjudicated by the district court. “Because none of these complaints were alleged in
[petitioner’s] successive petition or adjudicated by the district court, they are not properly before
this Court on appeal.” Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523–524, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283–1284
(2010) (quotation and citations omitted).

Therefore, Finch’s complaints about his post-

conviction counsel are not properly before this Court and should not be considered. 1
The only claim from his post-conviction petition that Finch addressed in any specific
manner in his Appellant’s brief is Claim (3)(a) – that the state violated Finch’s constitutional
rights by destroying some of the samples of materials recovered from under Finch’s residence
and/or by withholding that they had done so in violation of Brady. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)
In addressing this claim, the district court cited the standard applicable to Brady claims in which
the defendant pleads guilty, and concluded that Finch failed to submit sufficient admissible
evidence to establish that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the state’s destruction of
the materials found under the residence, Finch would not have pled guilty. (R., pp.145-149
(citing Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 162 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2007).) Specifically, the district
1

In his Appellant’s brief, Finch references the standard applicable to a district court’s
consideration of a motion for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14); see also Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-655, 152 P.3d 12, 1516 (2007) (“[w]hen considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial court must do
more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. The court must also consider
whether circumstances prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation into the
facts.”). This standard has no applicability to the present case, where the district court did
appoint counsel to represent Finch.
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court noted: (1) Finch relied on information contained in police reports to support his claim, but
failed to argue or demonstrate that he did not have access to these reports prior to the entry of his
guilty plea; (2) the police reports he relied upon clearly show that not all of the materials
recovered from underneath the residence were destroyed, and that the police took and preserved
samples of the bags that had been opened for testing. This, the court concluded, refuted Finch’s
claim that the destruction of the evidence precluded him from testing the materials himself and
challenging the state’s assertion that the materials could be used to make bombs; and (3) Finch
failed to present any evidence that, had the destroyed evidence been preserved for testing, this
would have changed his decision to plead guilty. (R., pp.148-149.) While Finch references this
claim in his Appellant’s brief, he does not argue that the district court applied an incorrect
standard or otherwise erred in reaching its conclusion.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)

Instead, he only argues that the trial court granted his motion to conduct forensic testing, but that
no materials were available to test. (Id.) This is not responsive to the grounds and reasoning for
dismissal as set forth by the district court. Finch’s assertions regarding this claim are therefore
waived because he has failed to assign any specific district court error, Hoisington, 104 Idaho at
159, 657 P.2d at 23, and because he has failed to support his claim with authority or argument,
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
Finch also appears to contend that the district court violated his constitutional rights by
failing to mail him a copy of its notice of intent to dismiss, which, Finch asserts, deprived him of
the opportunity to respond. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) This claim is not appropriately before
this court because it was not adjudicated below. In any event, I.R.C.P. 2.3(b) requires court
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orders to be served upon the attorney of record for each party. The certificate of mailing
associated with the district court’s memorandum decision and order and notice of intent to
dismiss indicates that this was done. (R., p.156.)
Finally, Finch asserts cumulative error. (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.) Once again, this
claim is not preserved because Finch failed to assert cumulative error in his post-conviction
petition. (See R., pp.5-14.) To the extent this Court chooses to reach the merits of this claim (or
any claim that may be construed from Finch’s Appellant’s brief), the state adopts the reasoning
set forth by the district court in its memorandum decision and order (R., pp.130-156), for the
proposition that Finch failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief
on any of his claims, let alone that he demonstrated multiple errors to cumulate.
Finch has failed to adequately present any issue for appellate review and/or has failed to
adequately support any issue with argument and authority or assign specific error to the district
court.

In any event, Finch has also failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in

summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

This Court should therefore affirm the

district court’s summary dismissal of Finch’s post-conviction petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Finch’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2018.

_/s/ Mark W. Olson_____________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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JOSHUA JAMES FINCH
IDOC #82165
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_/s/ Mark W. Olson_____________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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